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TRADEMARK REMEDIES AND ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES 
by 
Stacey L. Dogan* 
For several years now, courts and commentators have tussled over the 
question of whether online intermediaries can face liability under 
trademark law. Because both case law and commentary have largely 
focused on the threshold question of “trademark use,” we know little 
about what specific behavior will subject intermediaries to liability and 
what remedies might follow. This Essay takes some preliminary steps 
toward addressing those questions. 
 It begins by classifying claims against intermediaries into three general 
groups: general-confusion claims, failure-to-police claims, and failure-to-
respond claims. It contends that differences in the nature of these claims 
justify distinct approaches, both in evaluating liability and in 
considering the appropriate scope of relief. In particular, it contends that 
judges evaluating claims against intermediaries should resist trademark 
law’s general preference for broad prohibitory injunctions in favor of a 
tailored approach, given the significant benefits that can result from 
intermediaries’ use of trademarks online. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have spilled much ink over the question of whether and 
when online intermediaries can face liability under trademark law.1 So 
 
* Professor and Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. 
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far, both the scholarly debate and the case law have focused on the 
standards for infringement, asking whether parties such as search 
engines and auction sites can qualify as infringers under the Lanham 
Act.2 Can Google, for example, face liability for allowing advertisers to 
place ads keyed to protected trademarks? Is eBay legally responsible for 
every counterfeit product sold on its site? Despite years of debate, the 
substantive standards are only just beginning to take shape, and they 
reflect no model of clarity. But a few broad principles are beginning to 
emerge: that intermediaries can qualify as infringers under trademark 
law;3 that their liability should turn on their own role in creating 
confusion;4 and—at least in my optimistic reading of the courts’ 
opinions—that courts should be sensitive to the dangers of defining 
intermediary liability too broadly.5 In particular, at least some courts and 
commentators have expressed concern that overly-expansive liability 
could impoverish the online marketplace by making it harder for 
 
1 See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark 
Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 373 (2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, 
Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007); 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use]; 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the 
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Internet]; Greg 
Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (2008); Mark P. McKenna, 
Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 828; Uli Widmaier, 
Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 605 (2004); 
cf. Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 
595 (2005); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of 
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 107 (2005). 
2 See supra note 1; see also Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 124 (2d 
Cir. 2009); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
3 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 124; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape 
Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & 
Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 
2007). The European Court of Justice, on the other hand, has held that search 
engines who “use” marks merely to facilitate another’s advertisements are not 
themselves infringers. See Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08, & C-238/08, Google 
France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010 WL 1030379, ¶ 56 (March 23, 2010) (Grand 
Chamber) (“[S]uffice it to note that the use, by a third party, of a sign identical with, 
or similar to, the proprietor’s trade mark implies, at the very least, that that third 
party uses the sign in its own commercial communication. A referencing service 
provider allows its clients to use signs which are identical with, or similar to, trade 
marks, without itself using those signs.”). 
4 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 131 (“What Rescuecom alleges is that by 
the manner of Google’s display of sponsored links of competing brands in response 
to a search for [a] brand name (which fails adequately to identify the sponsored link 
as an advertisement, rather than a relevant search result), Google creates a likelihood 
of consumer confusion as to trademarks.”); Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 
WL 1159950, at *4; see generally Stacey L. Dogan, Beyond Trademark Use, 8 J. TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 135, 136–37 (2010). 
5 Cf. Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1034–36 (Berzon, J., concurring) (noting 
that the non-confusing use of trademarks to increase consumer choice should not 
constitute infringement). 
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competitors, critics, sellers of complementary products, and others to 
reach customers who might benefit from their informational offerings.6 
Given the plodding pace of our judicial system and the tendency 
toward settlement,7 none of the intermediary trademark suits has reached 
a final disposition; so we know little about what remedies courts will 
impose if and when they find liability. Indeed, the literature on 
intermediary liability has devoted little attention to the question of 
remedies. Yet the scope of relief granted in these cases will largely 
determine whether the threat of trademark liability serves as a limited 
and constructive market regulator or a drag on competition and speech. 
If courts exercise their remedial discretion wisely and sparingly, they may 
well avoid the chilling effects feared by many scholars, as well as 
advocates for consumer and speech interests.8 If, however, courts grant 
injunctions that require intermediaries broadly to police their networks, 
we could see an impoverishment of the information marketplace, to the 
detriment of competitors, consumers, and our society at large. 
This Essay offers some observations on the appropriate scope of 
relief in trademark suits against intermediaries. My comments are not 
only preliminary, but also highly speculative, because we have yet to see a 
single decision finding an intermediary liable under substantive 
trademark standards. Nonetheless, the existing case law offers some clues 
about the theories of liability most likely to persuade a court; this Essay 
focuses on these theories in thinking about suitable remedies. 
Normatively, I take it as a given that trademark law exists to promote 
informational clarity in markets, with fair competition as the underlying 
and ultimate goal.9 This economic lens—though not uncontested—
 
6 See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 497. 
7 See, e.g., Agreed Final Judgment, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 4:07-CV-
487-A (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/ 
district-courts/texas/txndce/4:2007cv00487/169927/104/0.pdf (the confidential 
settlement approved by the Court was presented by both parties’ counsel on Aug. 16, 
2007); Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Jews for Jesus v. Google 
Inc., No. 05 CV 10684 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006), available at http://docs.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2005cv10684/278090/1/0.pdf 
(involving a blog hosted on Google, resolved through settlement that transferred the 
blog to the trademark holder).  
8 See Brief for Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, 
Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d 123 (No. 06-4881-CV) (warning of risks to consumer 
interests if online intermediary liability is defined too broadly); Brief for Electronic 
Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Rescuecom Corp., 562 
F.3d 123 (No. 06-4881-CV) (warning of threats to free speech from broad 
intermediary liability under trademark law); Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use, supra 
note 1, at 1689; Dogan & Lemley, Internet, supra note 1, at 838. 
9 See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001) 
(“[P]rotection for trade dress exists to promote competition.”); Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“[T]rademark law, by preventing 
others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of 
shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily assures a 
potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same 
producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the 
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reflects the prevailing Supreme Court attitude toward trademarks, as well 
as the dominant approach among scholars.10 And it has important 
implications for trademark remedies: to serve trademark law’s goals, 
remedies should achieve an overall improvement in the quality of 
information available in the marketplace. Traditionally, trademark 
injunctions have done this by preventing parties from using others’ 
marks to confuse consumers over the source of their products. An 
injunction in such a case prevents a tangible harm—deceptive or 
unreliable product information—at a relatively low cost to the public, 
because the defendant has other choices to brand its goods. 
The ratio of benefit to harm from trademark injunctions has no 
doubt changed over time as courts have expanded the scope of 
trademark holders’ rights. Many scholars have challenged various aspects 
of this expansion on the ground that they limit competition and speech, 
and encourage socially wasteful expenditures on advertising and brand 
identity.11 The risk of anticompetitive effects becomes especially great 
 
past.” (citation omitted)); Standard Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 363 F.2d 945, 
954 (5th Cir. 1966) (“The essence of competition is the ability of competing products 
to obtain public recognition based on their own individual merit. A product has not 
won on its own merit if the real reason the public purchases it is that the public 
believes it is obtaining the product of another company.”); S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 
(1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (“Trade-marks, indeed, are the 
essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing 
articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other.”); see also David S. 
Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1659, 1687–89 (2004) (contending that the Supreme Court has 
returned to an unfair competition model of trademark protection, after flirting with a 
property-based approach); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 
205, 215 (2000) (expressing concerns about anticompetitive effects of overly broad 
trade dress protection). 
10 See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 (2003); Robert G. Bone, 
Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2105 (2004); Dogan & 
Lemley, Internet, supra note 1, at 778; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–69 (1987). But see 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark 
Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1639 (2007) (critiquing the search costs theory of 
trademark protection and contending that “as trademarks assume a greater social 
significance and business models elevate trademark law as a principal tool of 
information policy, trademark law may have to take into account concerns about 
individual autonomy that range more broadly than mere marketplace choice” 
(footnotes omitted)); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1842 (2007) (challenging the economic account of 
trademark protection: “Rather than forcing square pegs into the round holes of 
economic efficiency, advocates of the efficiency approach should acknowledge that 
courts traditionally operated under a different theoretical framework and be upfront 
about their own normative agenda.”). 
11 The literature is substantial, and I mention only a few examples here. See, e.g., 
Bone, supra note 10, at 2181; Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: 
The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1731 (1999); Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 485 (1999); William McGeveran, 
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when trademark law protects the product itself, rather than names or 
labels affixed to products. In such circumstances, trademark protection 
can inhibit competition in product markets, leading to allocative 
inefficiencies and inflated prices.12 
Whatever the harms from trademark injunctions against individual 
defendants, however, the prospect of injunctions against intermediaries 
raises the stakes dramatically. By “intermediaries,” I mean parties who are 
not themselves branding their products under a mark but are using the 
mark in some way to help a third party reach potential customers. EBay, 
for example, allows the use of marks as search terms on its auction site to 
connect sellers with people who might have an interest in their products. 
When the seller is offering a product manufactured by the trademark 
holder, eBay has an unambiguous legal right to do this.13 An injunction 
prohibiting eBay from using any particular trademark as a trigger for 
advertisements, then, would squash many uses that trademark law has 
long recognized as legitimate and that promote the law’s information-
related goals. This is so even if the injunction was based on a defensible 
legal conclusion that eBay’s use had led, or could lead, to consumer 
confusion in some cases.  
At the same time, trademark holders, courts, and many 
commentators understandably bristle at the idea of leaving 
intermediaries completely immune from liability under trademark law. 
Like other parties that enable infringement, some online intermediaries 
may deliberately sow confusion to divert attention to their advertisers’ 
products.14 Or they might refuse, despite clear notice, to block obvious 
infringement taking place on their services. When this happens, liability 
 
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 51 (2008); McKenna, supra note 10, 
at 1916; cf. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of 
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1205 (1948). 
12 See Lunney, supra note 11, at 479–80 (discussing welfare effects resulting from 
trademark protection of product features). 
13 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“Clearly, eBay and other online market websites may properly promote and facilitate 
the growth of legitimate secondary markets in brand-name goods.”); see also Designer 
Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819–20 (D. Ariz. 2009) 
(holding that an online seller had a legitimate interest in using the protected mark as 
a keyword to generate ads, when it sold the mark-holder’s products on its site); see 
generally Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(allowing resale and repair shop to use names of products it sells and services); Nitro 
Leisure Prods., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(permitting seller of refurbished golf balls to sell them under the manufacturer’s 
mark); Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1992) (“As a 
general rule, trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true 
mark even though the sale is not authorized by the mark owner.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
14 Cf. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(worrying that narrow approach to intermediary liability might exempt search 
engines from liability for using trademarks “in ways designed to deceive and cause 
consumer confusion”). 
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may well be appropriate. But, because of the potential cost of broad 
injunctions, courts must take care in crafting relief where benefits 
outweigh the burdens on competition and speech. 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part II describes 
the nature of trademark claims asserted against online intermediaries 
and tries to anticipate which claims might succeed, given the right facts. I 
divide intermediary claims into three types: general-confusion claims, 
which focus on the intermediary’s purported role in creating confusion 
over the general integrity of its informational services; failure-to-police 
claims, which attempt to hold the intermediary liable for any confusion 
enabled by its use of trademarks, even without any direct causal 
relationship between the intermediary’s own use and the resulting 
confusion; and failure-to-respond claims, which turn on the 
intermediary’s failure to respond to complaints of infringement by users 
of its services.  
Part III considers the implications of this claims classification for 
remedies analysis in intermediary suits. Given the difference in kind 
between traditional trademark infringement actions and claims against 
intermediaries, I contend that the general preference for broad 
prohibitory injunctions in trademark infringement suits makes little 
sense in the latter cases. Courts must use their general equitable 
discretion to tailor the remedy to the particular culpability of the 
intermediary defendant, taking care to avoid collateral damage. In 
particular, courts should take seriously their obligation to take the 
broader public interest into account when evaluating the proper scope of 
injunctive relief. I offer some concrete but tentative suggestions for 
courts crafting injunctions in intermediary trademark suits.  
II. DEFINING THE WRONG 
Trademark suits against intermediaries are different animals than 
the traditional, run-of-the-mill infringement suit.15 Most infringement 
actions involve a claim against a defendant that is branding its products 
under a mark.16 In evaluating liability, courts consider factors such as the 
similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks, products, and 
 
15 See generally Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use, supra note 1, at 1670 (“[B]efore 
the recent spate of Internet-related cases, no court had ever recognized a trademark 
claim of the sort that trademark holders are now asserting. Trademark infringement 
suits have always involved allegations of infringement by parties who use marks in 
connection with the promotion of their own goods and services.”). 
16 See id. at 1679–81 (discussing the historical distinction between direct and 
contributory infringement claims); see, e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 
141, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The test looks first to whether the plaintiff’s mark is entitled 
to protection, and second to whether defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause 
consumers confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of the defendant’s goods.” 
(emphasis added)). 
Do Not Delete 4/7/2010  5:15 PM 
2010] TRADEMARK REMEDIES 473 
customers;17 if the overlap creates a risk of consumer confusion as to the 
source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the parties’ products or services, the 
court generally enjoins the defendant’s continued use of the mark as a 
brand.18 
In the typical trademark case against an online intermediary, in 
contrast, the defendant is using a mark, not as a brand for its products, 
but as an informational device to connect a third party—the advertiser—
with potential customers.19 The plaintiffs in these cases are not claiming 
that the search engines are sowing confusion about the source of the 
intermediaries’ products and services. Instead, plaintiffs argue that the 
use of trademarks in keyword-based advertising causes confusion as to the 
source of the advertisers’ goods or services and seek to hold the search 
engine legally responsible for that confusion.  
While both courts and plaintiffs can be frustratingly non-specific in 
defining the nature and factual predicates for these intermediary 
trademark claims, the claims appear to fall into three rough groupings, 
which I call general-confusion claims, failure-to-police claims, and failure-
to-respond claims. Of course, most complaints allege an amalgam of 
these categories;20 nonetheless, classification can prove useful in 
disciplining courts and advocates to identify the nature of the 
defendant’s culpability—a critical prerequisite to deciding what remedy 
to impose in each case.21 
A. General-Confusion Claims 
General-confusion claims take issue with the overall search and 
advertising practices of search engines. Plaintiffs claim either that the 
mere use of trademarks as keyword-triggers causes consumer confusion, 
or that the search engine fails to adequately distinguish ads from search 
results, leaving consumers flummoxed as to the difference between them. 
 
17 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961) (identifying factors for evaluating likelihood of confusion); AMF Inc. v. 
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979); see generally 4 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:19 (4th ed. 
2009) (discussing the standard for infringement). 
18 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 30:1 (“An injunction is the usual and 
standard remedy once trademark infringement has been found.”). 
19 See generally Stacey L. Dogan, Trademarks and Consumer Information, in MEREDITH 
LECTURES: NOUVELLES APPROCHES EN PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE DANS UN MONDE 
TRANSSYSTÉMIQUE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: NEW APPROACHES TO IP IN A 
TRANSSYSTEMIC WORLD] 321 (2007) (contending that trademark-related Internet 
searches reveal consumer preferences and characteristics which search engines can 
use to enable better matches between advertisers and potential customers); Eric 
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 509 
(2005). 
20 See, e.g., Complaint at 5, 16–18, 31, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 4:08-
CV-626-A, 2009 WL 381995 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009). 
21 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) (requiring courts to define with particularity the basis 
for injunctive relief and the behavior covered by the injunction). 
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The first sort of claim—that keyword-triggered advertising is inherently 
confusing—is highly problematic given the wide range of noninfringing 
and non-confusing uses of this advertising method. As a result, even the 
courts that have found plausible trademark claims against intermediaries 
have shied away from condemning all keyword advertising, however 
presented and labeled.22  
Courts have shown more sympathy, however, to the argument that 
search engines’ presentation and labeling of advertisements contributes 
to consumer confusion.23 These general-confusion claims are trademark 
claims only in the broadest sense: Because some of these confused 
consumers may have used a trademark in their query, they might be 
doubly confused—in thinking that ads were organic search results, and 
in thinking that the trademark holder had sponsored or sanctioned each 
of them. 
I have argued elsewhere that trademark law provides a poor vehicle 
for addressing general-confusion claims,24 but these claims have found a 
warmer reception in the courts. In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc.,25 for 
example, the Second Circuit focused on general confusion in reversing a 
district court’s dismissal of trademark claims against Google:  
We have no idea whether Rescuecom can prove that Google’s use 
of Rescuecom’s trademark in its AdWords program causes 
likelihood of confusion or mistake. Rescuecom has alleged that it 
does, in that would-be purchasers (or explorers) of its services who 
search for its website on Google are misleadingly directed to the ads 
and websites of its competitors in a manner which leads them to 
believe mistakenly that these ads or websites are sponsored by, or 
affiliated with Rescuecom. This is particularly so, Rescuecom 
 
22 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(emphasizing plaintiff’s allegations regarding context and presentation of 
advertisements and search results); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns 
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting in dictum that trademark law 
would not apply to the use of plaintiff’s marks to trigger ads for “sites that legitimately 
use PEI’s marks,” sites that clearly identify their source in their ad, or sites that 
“overtly compare PEI’s products to a competitor’s”); GEICO v. Google, Inc., No. 
1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *6–7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (mem.) (holding that 
plaintiff had failed to establish likelihood of confusion from Google’s keyword-
triggered ads); see generally Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08, & C-238/08, Google 
France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2009 WL 2997620, ¶ 109 (Sept. 22, 2009 ) (opinion 
of Advocate General Maduro) (finding that the use of trademarks as keywords to 
trigger ads is not likely to lead to consumer confusion). 
23 See Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 131 (“What Rescuecom alleges is that by the 
manner of Google’s display of sponsored links of competing brands in response to a 
search for Rescuecom’s brand name (which fails adequately to identify the sponsored 
link as an advertisement, rather than a relevant search result), Google creates a 
likelihood of consumer confusion as to trademarks.”); Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 
1030 (“[W]e are evaluating a situation in which defendants display competitors’ 
unlabeled banner advertisements, with no label or overt comparison to PEI, after 
Internet users type in PEI’s trademarks.”). 
24 See, e.g., Dogan, supra note 4, at 139–41. 
25 562 F.3d at 124. 
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alleges, when the advertiser’s link appears in a horizontal band at 
the top of the list of search results in a manner which makes it 
appear to be the most relevant search result and not an 
advertisement. What Rescuecom alleges is that by the manner of Google’s 
display of sponsored links of competing brands in response to a search for 
Rescuecom’s brand name (which fails adequately to identify the 
sponsored link as an advertisement, rather than a relevant search 
result), Google creates a likelihood of consumer confusion . . . .26 
Several years earlier, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape 
Communications Corp., the Ninth Circuit was equally preoccupied with the 
search engine’s failure to clearly label its ads.27 Netscape had moved for 
summary judgment on Playboy’s claim that Netscape’s keyword 
advertising practices constituted direct and contributory trademark 
infringement. The Ninth Circuit found summary judgment 
inappropriate based largely on a survey that suggested consumers were 
confused as to the difference between search results and ads.28 
Throughout its opinion, the court emphasized the fact that the 
competitor ads were “unlabeled.”29 While it never quite defined 
“unlabeled,” the court appeared to mean two distinct things: first, that 
Netscape had not clearly labeled the advertising section of its website; 
and second, that the text of competitor ads did not identify the advertiser 
or its relationship to the trademarked product.30 The court suggested—
without holding—that clearer labeling might have reduced the risk of 
confusion.31  
To the extent that Playboy turned on confusion allegedly caused by 
ad text—including the failure to “label” the source of particular ads—the 
claims are more like failure-to-police or failure-to-respond claims, 
discussed below. But to the extent that Playboy turned on Netscape’s 
 
26 Id. at 130–31 (emphasis added). 
27 See Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1029; see generally id. at 1036 (Berzon, J., 
concurring) (“Our opinion limits the present holding [rejecting defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment] to situations in which the banner advertisements are not 
labeled or identified.”). 
28 Id. at 1026. Netscape had challenged the survey’s methodology and 
conclusions, but in the absence of any countervailing survey by Netscape, the court 
held that Netscape’s critique went only to the weight of the evidence, an 
inappropriate inquiry at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 1027. 
29 See id. at 1025 (“PEI asserts that users are likely to be confused regarding the 
sponsorship of unlabeled banner advertisements.”); id. (“Some consumers, initially 
seeking PEI’s sites, may initially believe that unlabeled banner advertisements are 
links to PEI’s sites or to sites affiliated with PEI.”); id. at 1030 (noting that court is not 
addressing situations of comparative advertising or advertising that identifies the 
source of the ad: “Rather, we are evaluating a situation in which defendants display 
competitors’ unlabeled banner advertisements, with no label or overt comparison to 
PEI, after Internet users type in PEI’s trademarks.”); id. at 1036 (Berzon, J., 
concurring).  
30 Id. at 1030. 
31 Id. at 1030 & n.43. 
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failure to adequately differentiate search results and ads, it falls squarely 
within the general-confusion category. 
General-confusion claims differ fundamentally from other 
trademark claims against intermediaries because they focus on the 
defendant’s own behavior, rather than imputing to it deceptive acts 
committed by another.32 This has implications both in determining 
liability and in evaluating the appropriate scope of relief. In evaluating 
liability, it suggests that courts should find infringement only if the 
plaintiff proves that the search engine’s failure to label, rather than its 
advertiser’s statements or misstatements, is indeed causing confusion 
among consumers.33 From a remedial perspective, it means that 
injunctive relief should target the problematic behavior specifically. If the 
problem is lack of labeling, the injunction should require labeling, rather 
than imposing a general obligation upon the search engine to police all 
conceivable infringement using its service. I discuss this remedial issue in 
more detail below. 
B. Failure-to-Police Claims 
Under a failure-to-police approach, plaintiffs allege that particular 
keyword-generated ads are confusing, and seek to hold the search engine 
liable for failing to block the ads ex ante. The reasoning goes like this: the 
search engine “used” the mark by allowing advertisers to purchase ads 
keyed to the mark as a search term; some of these ads confuse 
consumers, either by suggesting association with the trademark holder or 
by failing to disclaim any relationship; and because the search engine’s 
use of the mark played a but-for role in enabling this confusion, the 
search engine itself is an infringer.34 I call these claims “failure-to-police” 
claims because they suggest that the search engine has an affirmative 
obligation to weed out infringing ads before they appear, rather than 
after obtaining actual knowledge of their confusing nature. 
I have argued elsewhere that failure-to-police claims, like their 
failure-to-respond counterparts, should be evaluated under standards of 
contributory, rather than direct, trademark infringement.35 The nature of 
 
32 For this reason, general-confusion claims fit more closely into the traditional 
model for direct trademark infringement than do the other forms of trademark 
claims against intermediaries. See Dogan, supra note 4, at 151–53. 
33 See id.  
34 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 20, at 37 (“[T]he use of American Airlines 
Marks . . . within the text of Sponsor Result advertisements by third-party advertisers 
is likely to deceive or cause confusion among web users . . . . Through their sale of the 
American Airlines Marks . . . to third-party advertisers, Defendants provide such third-
party advertisers with aid and material contribution to the third-party advertisers’ 
violations of the Lanham Act.”). 
35 See Dogan, supra note 4, at 137–138. Under this approach, the likelihood-of-
confusion test would inquire into whether a particular advertiser was creating 
confusion as to the source or sponsorship of its products or services; the search 
engine’s liability would turn on whether it continued to facilitate the ad after 
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these claims is intrinsically derivative because it turns on confusion 
between the trademark holder and the advertiser’s products and services. 
Trademark law has historically taken care not to impose liability in these 
circumstances unless the intermediary induced the infringement or 
continued to provide support to a particular infringer with knowledge 
that its support was contributing to continuing infringement.36 And it has 
done so for good reason. Just as the staple article of commerce doctrine 
in copyright law protects sellers of “dual-use” technologies from liability 
when those technologies are used to infringe,37 so too does trademark law 
avoid imposing an obligation to investigate upon every party whose 
product or service might contribute to infringement.38 The alternative 
would give trademark holders effective economic control over non-
infringing behavior—including behavior such as explicit comparative 
advertising that promotes trademark law’s information-facilitating goals.39 
The fact that search engines use trademarks to trigger ads should 
not affect the nature of this inquiry. Every area of intellectual property 
 
receiving knowledge of its infringing nature. Failure-to-police claims, because they 
seek to require an intermediary to police its network even before receiving any 
specific knowledge, would rarely prevail under this standard. 
36 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (“[I]f a 
manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or 
if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is 
engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is 
contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.”); see also 
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Ivax Pharms., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 925, 943 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“As 
Inwood makes clear, only proof that defendants knew their products were being falsely 
advertised by third party retailers is enough to trigger liability. . . . [The plaintiff] has 
come forward with no evidence that defendants did in fact know [of the false 
statements at issue].”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. 
Supp. 949, 964 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Contributory infringement doctrine has always 
treated uncertainty of infringement as relevant to the question of an alleged 
contributory infringer’s knowledge.”). 
37 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441–42 
(1984).  
38 See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 
1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that flea market operator had “no affirmative duty to 
take precautions against the sale of counterfeits” on its premises). If anything, the 
Supreme Court has instructed courts to define third-party liability claims more strictly 
in trademark law than in copyright law. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 439 & n.19 
(noting the differences between copyright’s contributory infringement standard and 
the “narrow standard for contributory trademark infringement” announced in 
Inwood); see also Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp., 955 F.2d at 1150 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court tells us that secondary liability for trademark infringement should, in any 
event, be more narrowly drawn than secondary liability for copyright infringment.”); 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The tests 
for secondary trademark infringement are even more difficult to satisfy than those 
required to find secondary copyright infringement.”). 
39 Cf. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 440–42 (“The staple article of commerce 
doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for 
effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of 
others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.” (emphasis added)). 
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law insulates parties whose behavior may contribute to infringement, but 
also has substantial noninfringing use.40 Without doubt, trademark-
triggered keyword advertisements have significant noninfringing 
applications.41 They should no more lead to strict liability than should the 
sale of look-alike drugs that may tempt pharmacists to make illegal 
substitutions.42 
Failure-to-police claims, in other words, should generally fail in the 
online intermediary context. Unless the defendant has induced 
infringement or obtained actual knowledge of infringement by particular 
advertisers, trademark doctrine should not make the defendant 
responsible for the confusing content of its customers’ ads.  
Nonetheless, some of the opinions addressing intermediary 
trademark liability appear to have accepted a failure-to-police theory by 
imputing to the intermediary the content of its advertisers’ ads. The 
trend began in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., in 
which the Ninth Circuit assessed Netscape’s liability by considering the 
likelihood of confusion between its advertisers’ products and services, and 
those offered by Playboy.43 In several places in the opinion, the court 
suggested that Netscape had an affirmative duty to monitor the content 
of its customers’ ads and to preempt customer click-throughs that 
resulted from confusion: 
Defendants monitor “click-through” rates on the advertisements 
they display. That is, they monitor the number of times consumers 
are diverted to their advertisers’ sites. They use the click-through 
rates as a way to gauge the success of the advertisements and to 
keep advertisers coming back to their services. Although some click-
throughs may be the result of legitimate consumer interest, not confusion, 
some may be expected to result from confusion. Defendants will profit 
from both kinds of click-throughs. And they do nothing to ensure 
 
40 See Inwood Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. at 861 (White, J., concurring) (noting that 
contributory trademark infringement doctrine precludes claims against parties based 
merely on the sale of products legal in themselves but similar enough to a branded 
product to create a risk of illegal substitution by third parties); Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow 
Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass. 1946) (refusing to impose 
obligation on seller of legitimate cola product to take precautions to avoid product 
substitution by “some rouges [sic] in the bar business”); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464 
U.S. at 440–42 (introducing copyright’s staple article of commerce doctrine); see also 
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198 (1980) (discussing staple 
article of commerce doctrine in patent law). 
41 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1030 
(9th Cir. 2004).  
42 Cf. Inwood Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. at 861 (“The mere fact that a generic drug 
company can anticipate that some illegal substitution will occur to some unspecified 
extent, and by some unknown pharmacists, should not by itself be a predicate for 
contributory liability.”). 
43 354 F.3d at 1026–29. 
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that only click-throughs based on legitimate interest, as opposed to 
confusion, occur.44  
The court did not indicate how the search engine could identify 
click-throughs that resulted from confusion, but it did offer steps that 
Netscape’s designers could take to reduce the risk of confusion-based 
clicks: they could label the advertisements, they could “require that 
advertisers identify themselves on their banner ads,” or they could 
“remove the highly-rated terms ‘playboy’ and ‘playmate’ from their lists 
of keywords,” particularly when the advertiser asked them to do so.45 
Eliminating the keywords from the list of triggers would, of course, satisfy 
Playboy; but it would cut off use of the Playboy marks by numerous 
parties with a legitimate interest in using the terms.46 The other 
preventative measures suggested by the Court, albeit in dictum, raise 
intriguing questions, both about trademark’s liability standards and 
about the appropriate scope of relief. 
From a liability perspective, the Court’s dictum suggests that, in 
considering an intermediary’s liability for failure to police, courts should 
take into account whether a change in the intermediary’s policies vis-à-vis 
ad text could reduce the levels of infringement on its service. If requiring 
advertisers to identify themselves in ad text reduced confusion, for 
example, the court suggests that the failure to adopt such a policy might 
be a reason to impose liability. 
In the abstract, this approach has some appeal: if an intermediary’s 
business model is causing infringement, and it can costlessly reduce that 
infringement through a simple change in policy, then perhaps we should 
charge it with doing so.47 But the real world rarely presents such simple 
fixes. For one thing, in the search context, we lack reliable information—
let alone consensus—about which policies regarding ad text are most 
likely to dispel confusion.48 While Playboy’s dictum suggests that explicit 
comparisons between the advertiser and the trademark holder would 
probably pass trademark muster,49 the district court in GEICO held that 
 
44 Id. at 1029 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1028 (noting that Netscape had 
done “nothing to prevent click-throughs that result from confusion” (footnote 
omitted)). 
45 Id. at 1028–29.  
46 Playboy involved a somewhat unique set of facts because Netscape required any 
advertiser of adult-related content to include the Playboy marks in the package of 
keywords that would generate an ad for its product. See id. at 1023.  
47 See generally Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary 
Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 265 (2005) (contending that gatekeeper liability 
“should turn entirely on the balance between the misconduct’s social costs and how 
effectively the intermediary can sanction the misconduct.”).  
48 See, e.g., GEICO v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *5 (E.D. 
Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (mem.) (noting weakness in survey whose “control did not reveal 
which aspects of the insurance-related Sponsored Links caused respondents’ 
confusion—the use of GEICO’s mark in the ads or the ads’ mere reference to 
insurance.”). 
49 Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1030. 
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the use of trademarks in ad text creates confusion for which the search 
engine might be liable.50 The GEICO court—relying on an admittedly 
flawed survey—failed to distinguish between different ways in which 
advertisers might incorporate trademarks into the text of their ads.51 The 
truth is that some uses of trademarks in the text of advertisements may 
well confuse consumers, but many others will inform rather than 
confuse, and thus promote trademark law’s goals. Indeed, one could 
argue that search engines would reduce confusion by insisting that their 
keyword advertisers refer to the trademark holder and explain its 
relevance to their products; this would ensure that consumers 
understand the relationship between their search term and the ad at 
issue.52  
My point is not to challenge or defend any particular view on which 
policies on ad text would achieve the lowest level of infringement. I 
mention the subtle difference between the GEICO and Playboy courts’ 
treatment of trademarks in ad text only to demonstrate that search 
engines cannot solve the problem of confusion (if it exists) through a 
single shift in ad text policy. Mentioning trademarks in ad text can 
confuse, but it can also clarify. Whether a particular use clarifies or 
confounds turns on the identity of the advertiser, the products it offers, 
and the overall content of the ad. Given that, imposing liability on a 
search engine because it allows trademarks to appear in ads reflects a 
woeful mismatch between the definition of infringement and the harms 
that infringement law is designed to address. And the injunction that 
would naturally follow—an order to bar the use of trademarks in ads—
would prohibit all sorts of desirable, information-facilitating uses of 
marks.  
Failure-to-police liability, in other words, can do more harm than 
good. It is precisely for this reason that trademark law—like every other 
area of intellectual property law—generally avoids imposing any duty on 
parties to prevent someone else’s infringement.53 In the copyright 
 
50 See GEICO, 2005 WL 1903128, at *7. The court relied upon a survey finding 
that ads using GEICO in their ad text generated high degrees of consumer confusion. 
Presumably, few of these ads involved express and accurate product comparisons, or 
any of the other uses of trademarks that are truthful and legitimate.  
51 Id. 
52 Both Yahoo! and Microsoft follow this policy. See Microsoft Advertising, Ad 
Content Guidelines, http://advertising.microsoft.com/learning-center/best-practices/ 
ad-content-guidelines/#trademarks; Yahoo! Search Marketing, Trademarks, 
http://searchmarketing.yahoo.com/legal/trademarks.php. Unlike Google, neither 
Yahoo! nor Microsoft allows competitors to place trademark-triggered keyword ads, 
but they do allow resellers and information sites to use trademark-triggered 
advertising as long as the ad describes the particular product or information that can 
be found at its site. See id. Google currently allows, but does not require, the use of 
trademarks in advertisements by resellers, information providers, and sellers of 
compatible products. See Google AdWords, What is Google’s Trademark Policy?, http:// 
adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?answer=145626.  
53 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see 
also cases cited supra note 38. 
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context, courts have stopped short of requiring sellers to redesign dual-
use products to minimize third parties’ infringement.54 Patent law’s 
contributory infringement standard likewise immunizes sellers of staple 
articles, without inquiring into alternative designs or policies.55 While the 
law of contributory trademark infringement is substantially less 
developed, the Supreme Court has made clear that trademark 
defendants deserve, if anything, broader protection against liability for 
another’s infringement.56 The courts that have imputed trademark 
infringement to intermediaries have violated this longstanding rule. 57 
 
54 See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 n.12 (2005) 
(“[I]n the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find 
contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps 
to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.”). But see In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“Even when there are noninfringing uses of an Internet file-
sharing service, . . . if the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a 
contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it would have been 
disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the 
infringing uses.”). 
55 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 220 (1980) (noting 
that distinction between staple and non-staple goods “ensures that the patentee’s 
right to prevent others from contributorily infringing his patent affects only the 
market for the invention itself.”); cf. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. at 932–33 (noting that 
patent law’s staple article doctrine “absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item 
with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more 
acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will be 
misused.”). 
56 See cases cited supra notes 36, 38; see also Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. 
Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that a flea 
market operator “has no affirmative duty to take precautions against the sale of 
counterfeits.”). 
57 See, e.g., Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF 
(RS), 2007 WL 1159950, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (noting that the Playboy court 
had “weighed the Sleekcraft factors as if Netscape were responsible for the 
competitors’ advertisements,” and doing the same in evaluating Google’s trademark 
liability); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 292–93 (D.N.J. 
2006) (noting the search engine’s legitimate use of trademarks for “comparative 
advertising, resale of JR’s products, or the provision of information about JR or its 
products,” but nonetheless holding that “fairness would dissipate, and protection 
under a fair use defense would be lost, if GoTo wrongfully participated in someone 
else’s infringing use”); GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 
2004) (“Accepting as true the facts alleged by plaintiff regarding the inclusion of the 
marks in advertisements and the defendants’ overall control of their advertising 
program, we find that plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to support their claims 
that advertisers make a ‘trademark use’ of GEICO’s marks, and that defendants may 
be liable for such ‘trademark use.’”). The court later significantly narrowed its 
holding, finding that only ads specifically using GEICO’s marks were likely to cause 
confusion, and expressing uncertainty over whether Google should face liability for 
the ads. See GEICO v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *7 (E.D. Va. 
Aug. 8, 2005) (mem.). 
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Precedent aside,58 failure-to-police liability could make sense as an 
economic matter if—and only if—the benefits from requiring 
intermediaries to prevent infringement outweighed their costs.59 And the 
costs of policing are substantial. Not only would the search engine’s 
customers have to absorb the price of its monitoring efforts, but risk 
aversion would no doubt lead to incursions on legitimate speech.60 
Absent compelling evidence that intermediaries could efficiently prevent 
infringement—and that their prevention efforts would bring about more 
benefit than cost—reason counsels against changing the law to impose 
monitoring obligations on intermediaries.  
C. Failure-to-Respond Claims 
The third category of claims involves the intermediary’s failure to 
respond after receiving knowledge of infringement resulting from use of 
its service. This form of liability reflects a logical extension of trademark’s 
contributory infringement doctrine.61 Mindful of the doctrine’s broad 
potential reach, some courts have imposed an additional requirement 
that a defendant providing a service have “direct control and 
monitoring” over the directly infringing party.62  
If applied carefully, failure-to-respond liability has the potential to 
achieve an effective balance between trademark holders’ interests in 
preventing infringement and intermediaries’ interests in promoting fair 
 
58 Since the precedent comes from the Supreme Court, only the Supreme 
Court—or Congress—has the authority to change it. See Mann & Belzley, supra note 
47, at 250 (“[T]he time has come for the Internet to grow up and for Congress and 
the businesses that rely on the Internet to accept a mature scheme of regulation that 
limits the social costs of illegal Internet conduct in the most cost-effective manner.”). 
59 See id. at 265; cf. Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for 
Napster and Other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 950 (2001) (contending 
that, in the copyright context, “if the nature of a party’s control over its users makes it 
feasible and essentially costless to distinguish between infringing and non-infringing 
applications, the law should require it to do so” (footnotes omitted)). 
60 See Mann & Belzley, supra note 47, at 273 (noting costs of gatekeeper liability); 
see generally James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (contending that risk aversion, combined with the iterative 
nature of intellectual property doctrine, can lead to an ever-narrowing scope of legal 
but unauthorized uses). 
61 The Supreme Court’s first definition of the doctrine did not include parties 
who provided services, rather than products, to known infringers. See Inwood Labs., 
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 (1982). Subsequent courts, however, have 
extended the doctrine to those who continue to provide services to third parties, 
when they have both control over the direct infringer and knowledge that they are 
contributing to its infringement. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 
F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp., 955 F.2d at 1148–49; see 
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that 
entities “that provide a marketplace for infringement and maintain direct control 
over that venue” may face contributory liability if they have the requisite knowledge). 
62 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 795–800 (9th Cir. 
2007); see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 505–06. 
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and legitimate uses of marks in the online context. To be sure, it imposes 
an obligation on the trademark holder to notify defendants of infringing 
uses of their marks. As a result, most trademark holders have thus far 
focused on more aggressive forms of liability, hoping that courts will put 
the burden of enforcement on intermediaries. Because general-
confusion and failure-to-police claims may well prove inadequate to stem 
particular acts of infringement, trademark holders may increasingly turn 
to the failure-to-respond sort of claim. 
As they develop this species of intermediary liability, courts should 
keep in mind the same limiting principles that guided the discussion of 
the other two forms above. In particular, in their haste to find a plausible 
gatekeeper, courts should take care not to impose liability that would 
threaten legal and legitimate uses of marks online.  
1. Knowledge 
In the context of failure-to-respond claims, most of the heavy lifting 
will likely fall upon the courts’ definition of knowledge. If courts found 
general knowledge of infringement enough to trigger a duty to respond, 
they would effectively be adopting failure-to-police liability under the 
guise of contributory infringement. At the other extreme, if courts 
insisted upon incontestable proof of infringement, they would make it 
virtually impossible for trademark holders to get effective relief, even 
against blatantly infringing uses of their marks online. As a result, courts 
in these cases should adopt a flexible approach to knowledge that gives 
effective tools to trademark holders while protecting intermediaries 
against liability that would ultimately disserve trademark law’s goals. I 
suggest three guidelines that courts might follow in pursuing this goal. 
First, for the reasons outlined above, courts should follow established 
precedent and refuse to find knowledge based merely on the fact that the 
defendant offers a service that parties can (mis)use to infringe.63 So far, 
those courts that have considered intermediary claims through a failure-
to-respond lens have adhered to the traditional standard, requiring a 
“showing that a defendant knew or had reason to know of specific 
instances of actual infringement.”64 
Second, trademark holders observing a violation of their rights 
should have a quick and efficient way to put intermediaries on notice of 
claims of infringement. An intermediary that refused to accept such 
notices, or implausibly denied having received them, could not escape 
liability on that basis.65 Notice alone, of course, would not establish 
 
63 See supra notes 37–38, 53–56 and accompanying text. 
64 Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 510; cf. Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 
652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that “‘exceptional 
circumstances’ must be shown to prove the degree of knowledge required to impose 
contributory liability for cybersquatting,” as distinguished from plain-vanilla 
infringement). 
65 See Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 265 (“[A] swap meet can not disregard its vendors’ 
blatant trademark infringements with impunity.”); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp., 955 
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knowledge of infringement; it “gives notice only of the [trademark 
holder’s] position regarding the matter.”66 But notice would trigger a 
duty to investigate the claim to determine whether infringement was 
occurring.67 
Finally, courts should find “knowledge” of infringement only when 
the infringement is sufficiently clear that no reasonable person could 
view the use of the mark as protected or otherwise non-infringing.68 As 
the Netcom court concluded in the copyright context: 
Where a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of 
infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack 
of copyright notices on the copies, or the copyright holder’s failure 
to provide the necessary documentation to show that there is a 
likely infringement, the operator’s lack of knowledge will be found 
reasonable and there will be no liability for contributory 
infringement for allowing the continued distribution of the works 
on its system.69 
This breathing space is especially critical in the trademark context. 
Because trademark infringement turns on a complex set of factors 
involving the parties’ respective products, customers, and sales and 
marketing channels, evaluating a claim of infringement can be 
challenging, even for a court.70 The context-specific nature of trademark 
law’s defenses only compounds the difficulty of determining whether a 
particular use infringes. Given the importance of preserving these non-
 
F.2d at 1148–49 (finding that the knowledge requirement can be satisfied by proof 
that the defendant was “willfully blind” to infringement occurring on its premises). 
66 Solid Host NL, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; see also Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice 
Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 691 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that “sixteen or 
fewer days of inchoate suspicion—engendered solely by the allegations in [the 
trademark holder’s] demand letter—cannot as a matter of law be deemed willful 
blindness” to trademark infringement). 
67 See Fare Deals, Ltd., 180 F. Supp. 2d at 690. 
68 See id. at 691 (finding no knowledge of infringement when “[t]he 
infringement at issue is not so transparent—even to the legally adept—as handbags 
labeled Louis Vuitton and Gucci, cheaply made, lined with purple vinyl, and sold by 
itinerant peddlers at bargain-basement prices” (citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 
F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989))); see also Solid Host NL, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (“The 
extent [of an intermediary’s duty to investigate] will be circumscribed by the relative 
difficulty of confirming or denying the accusation under the facts of a particular 
case.”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 964 
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (“The existence of numerous legitimate, non-infringing uses of the 
[trademark] further illustrates the uncertainty inherent in the question of whether 
NSI knew or had reason to know of infringing uses of domain name registrations,” 
even after receiving notice from the trademark holder). 
69 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 
1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  
70 See Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 963 (“The likelihood of confusion test 
examines the totality of circumstances under which a mark is used. The outcome of 
the test cannot be predicted from an examination of the mark and the domain name 
in connection with a brief statement of the purpose for which the mark is being 
used.” (citation omitted)). 
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infringing uses of marks—and given the availability of direct 
infringement claims against advertisers to decide the close cases—courts 
should err against imposing liability unless the claim of infringement is 
verifiable and clear. 
2. Continuing to Provide 
After receiving sufficient notice, an intermediary that fails to 
respond by disabling the infringement could well face liability under 
trademark law.71 As a practical matter, most of the major search 
engines—as well as eBay—arguably satisfy their obligations to respond to 
notice of infringement. Each of them has a system under which 
trademark holders may complain of infringement; and each has a policy 
of reviewing those claims and disabling offending ads.72 EBay has a 
complex procedure for responding to notices of infringement—a 
procedure that the district court in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc. found 
robust and legally adequate.73 Nonetheless, the contributory 
infringement framework provides a basis for liability against 
intermediaries that act less responsibly in responding to trademark 
holder claims.  
D. A Word on Inducement 
So far, I have said nothing about the second form of contributory 
liability anticipated by the Inwood court: liability for inducement. 
Inducement liability, which requires a defendant to “intentionally 
induce[] another to infringe a trademark,” is unlikely to apply to most 
online intermediaries.74 When it does apply—and the evidence shows a 
deliberate scheme to encourage infringement—liability should follow.75 
The arguments in favor of protecting non-infringing uses have little 
weight when a defendant is intentionally inducing others to infringe.76 
 
71 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996); cf. 
AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1433 & n.14 (3d Cir. 
1994) (finding no claim for contributory infringement when defendant “took 
appropriate steps to reprimand and discipline” the party engaged in direct 
infringement). 
72 See Yahoo! Search Marketing, supra note 52; Google AdWords, supra note 52. 
73 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“[T]he Court finds that eBay responded appropriately to notice of specific 
infringing items . . . .”). 
74 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). See also 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be 
liable as an infringer.”).  
75 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(expressing concern about a rule under which “the operators of search engines 
would be free to use trademarks in ways designed to deceive and cause consumer 
confusion”). 
76 Cf. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005) (“[W]here 
evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put 
to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting 
infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability.”). 
Do Not Delete 4/7/2010  5:15 PM 
486 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2 
III. SETTING REMEDIAL GOALS 
Courts have broad discretion in crafting remedies in trademark 
infringement suits.77 According to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, courts must take into account not only the harms resulting 
from the infringement, but also the public interest and the defendant’s 
interest in legitimate uses of the mark.78 In the intermediary context, this 
means that courts should craft injunctions narrowly to address the 
wrongful conduct by the defendant and must take care not to impede 
legitimate, information-facilitating uses of marks.  
With those goals in mind, I offer a few modest suggestions to courts 
entering injunctions in trademark suits against intermediaries. 
Doctrinally, my proposals break no new ground. The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure instruct every court entering an injunction to “state the 
reasons why it issued,” to “state its terms specifically,” and to “describe in 
reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required.”79 My 
suggestions essentially mirror these standard requirements. But the 
unique features of lawsuits against intermediaries—including, in 
particular, the awkward fit between the intermediary’s own behavior and 
the prevention of consumer confusion—give the rules unique 
significance in these cases and thus deserve attention. 
A. Tailor the Injunction to the Defendant’s Wrongful Acts 
Courts granting injunctions have an obligation to identify with 
specificity the acts that justify injunctive relief, and to tailor their 
injunction accordingly.80 This rule has particular relevance when the line 
 
77 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 (1995). 
78 The Restatement lists six factors that courts should consider in evaluating 
“[t]he appropriateness and scope of injunctive relief” in trademark cases. Id. The 
factors include: “(a) the nature of the interest to be protected; (b) the nature and 
extent of the wrongful conduct; (c) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an 
injunction and of other remedies; (d) the relative harm likely to result to the 
legitimate interests of the defendant if an injunction is granted and to the legitimate 
interests of the plaintiff if an injunction is denied; (e) the interests of third persons 
and of the public; (f) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or 
otherwise asserting its rights; (g) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff; 
and (h) the practicality of framing and enforcing the injunction.” Id. 
79 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d); see generally Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 
F.2d 389, 395 (2d Cir. 1989) (parties bound by injunction “must be able to ascertain 
from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden”). 
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d); see also Edu. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 545 
(3d Cir. 1986) (“An injunction must not only meet the specificity requirement set 
forth in Rule 65(d), it also cannot be broader than necessary to restrain the unlawful 
conduct.”); E. W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1116 (8th Cir. 
1969) (vacating an injunction that was “far broader than [was] warranted by the 
findings of fact”); see generally Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 
110, 126 (1948) (“The precise practices found to have violated the act should be 
specifically enjoined.”), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984). 
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between lawful and unlawful conduct is a fine one, so that a broad 
injunction could proscribe or chill legitimate behavior.81  
Given the range of allegations against intermediaries and the but-for 
relationship between intermediary behavior and plausible claims of 
infringement, courts might feel tempted to broadly enjoin the use of a 
plaintiff’s trademark after finding infringement in a particular case. They 
should resist this temptation.  
The nature of the intermediary’s wrongful act should dictate the 
nature of the injunction. If the court finds infringement on a general-
confusion theory, it should identify with specificity how the 
intermediary’s search policies are causing confusion, and the injunction 
should remedy that problem. If, for example, the search engine confuses 
users by failing to distinguish search results from ads, the injunction 
should insist on a more careful differentiation. It should not—however 
ardently the trademark holder might desire this result—prohibit the 
general use of the trademark in keyword-based advertising, because of 
the many legitimate and non-confusing uses of that service.82 Courts 
should rarely, if ever, find liability based on failure to police; given that, 
injunctive relief should avoid imposing such an obligation. 
Injunctions in failure-to-respond cases will require a careful 
examination of context. A court finding inadequate response to 
notifications of obvious infringement, for example, might order the 
defendant to adopt procedures that would enable a more effective 
response. If the procedures are adequate but result in excessively bad 
judgment in a particular case, the court could specify the feature of the 
offending ad that was likely to cause confusion and could require the 
intermediary to respond to future notifications regarding ads that shared 
that feature. In all of these cases, the remedy should surgically address 
the act that constituted infringement without affecting otherwise legal 
behavior. 
B. Be Specific 
Courts have identified three reasons for the requirement of 
specificity in crafting injunctive relief:  
[First, it] prevents uncertainty on the part of those faced with 
injunctive orders and gives them explicit notice of what conduct is 
unlawful. Second, it allows a reviewing court “to know precisely 
what it is reviewing.” . . . [Third,] a specific injunction allows those 
who are protected by its terms to know when the order is being 
 
81 Cf. Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 330 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding an 
injunction overly broad when “the original scope of the valid trade secrets was so 
narrow that expanded protection would tend to restrict competition”). 
82 See, e.g., e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 605 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(vacating an injunction where “the relief awarded does not bear a legitimate 
relationship to the facts necessary to support” a judgment against the defendant). 
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violated so that they may then effectively police the order and 
enforce its mandate.83 
These rationales have special salience in cases involving uncertain 
boundaries between lawful and unlawful behavior.84 In these cases, courts 
must put parties on notice of which acts are illegal and will violate the 
injunction. The absence of such guidance leaves parties guessing as to 
whether their behavior falls within or beyond the injunction. This 
guessing game could have three outcomes, all undesirable: the defendant 
could guess wrong and engage in behavior that she viewed as protected 
but turns out to form a basis for contempt; she could guess wrong in the 
other direction and abstain from behavior that is desirable and legal; or 
she could guess correctly but be moved by risk-aversion to avoid behavior 
that falls close to the line. 
This rule, too, has implications for intermediary claims. Because of 
the significant non-infringing uses of trademarks online, courts must use 
specificity in identifying behavior that they view as unlawful. In general-
confusion claims, the court should not simply insist that the intermediary 
change its policies to cure any confusion; it should specify exactly how 
the intermediary should alter its labeling or other practices to reduce the 
risk of confusion. In failure-to-respond claims, courts should identify the 
steps that an intermediary must take to improve the quality of its 
response to notice of infringement.  
C. Protect Lawful Uses 
My third suggestion relates closely to the first one: courts should 
ensure that injunctions neither proscribe nor chill legitimate uses of 
marks, particularly those that promote trademark law’s goals.85 In crafting 
 
83 Daniels v. Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128, 1134 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting 
Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476–77 (1974)). 
84 See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(vacating a trademark injunction that “unreasonably requires the parties to guess at 
the kinds of conduct that will be deemed infringement”); see also Am. Red Cross v. 
Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 1412 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that 
defendant “should not have to risk citation for contempt in order to determine the 
true scope of activity barred by the district court’s order”); Am. Can Co., 742 F.2d at 
333 (“The defendants cannot be expected to decide, even with caution, under the 
threat of contempt whether their conduct is lawful without more guidance from the 
court.”); E. W. Bliss Co., 408 F.2d at 1114 (reversing an injunction when “[t]he lower 
court appears inclined to let the defendants reach the legal conclusion that a 
particular design concept is a ‘trade secret’ of [the plaintiff]. These defendants would 
then be able to test their legal opinion on the law of trade secrets and their technical 
opinion on the state of the prior art in a proceeding to show cause why they should 
not be held in contempt.”). 
85 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 924 n.67 (1982) (vacating 
an injunction that encompassed legal behavior, noting that the “injunction must be 
modified to restrain only unlawful conduct and the persons responsible for conduct 
of that character”); Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 
665, 669 (8th Cir. 1987) (vacating an order that “too broadly requires [the 
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injunctions, courts should have in mind the ways in which trademarks 
may be used lawfully and should ensure that the injunction is not so 
broad as to proscribe them.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cases alleging trademark infringement by online intermediaries 
involve a tricky balance between the interests of the trademark holder 
and the public. The traditional rules of contributory trademark 
infringement have evolved to accommodate that balance. Courts 
evaluating this new form of trademark claim should take care not to 
upset that careful calibration, either in defining liability or in designing 
relief. 
 
defendant] to guess at what kind of conduct would be deemed trademark 
infringement”); Edu. Testing Servs., 793 F.2d at 545 (narrowing a copyright injunction 
whose prohibitions were “broader than the scope of the copyright laws”); Am. 
Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imps., Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[A] 
court may not enter an injunction the practical effect of which is to preclude the 
defendant from using the functional features of the plaintiffs’ combination.”). 
